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Opening Closed Doors: How the Current Law 
Surrounding Nondisclosure Agreements Serves 
the Interests of Victims of Sexual Harassment, 
and the Best Avenues for Its Reform. 
By D. Andrew Rondeau† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Among the plethora of pervasive and long-obscured women’s issues 
suddenly exposed by the #MeToo Movement, nondisclosure agreements 
(“NDAs”) have taken center stage. Indeed, it was the public revelation 
of Harvey Weinstein’s unchecked behavior and NDA protections that 
thrust the #MeToo Movement into the national limelight.1 Both the 
Weinstein2 and Stormy Daniels3 stories perfectly illustrate the reasons 
behind such intense public concern. Wealthy, sophisticated parties can 
bind financially vulnerable victims to private avenues of relief that are 
unlikely to remedy the harm caused and likely to perpetuate patterns 
of sexual harassment and abuse.4 To anyone unfamiliar with American 
law, the idea that courts enforce these agreements smacks of blatant 
injustice. Even many familiar with American law strongly believe that 
something ought to change. 
 
 †  B.A. 2017, Williams College; J.D. Candidate, The University of Chicago Law School. I would 
like to thank Professor Omri Ben-Shahar and the 2018–2019 Board of the Legal Forum for their 
generous advice and feedback throughout the Comment process. 
 1 See Samantha Schmidt, #MeToo: Harvey Weinstein Case Moves Thousands to Tell Their 
Own Stories of Abuse, Break Silence, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/10/16/me-too-alyssa-milano-urged-assault-victims-to-tweet-in-solida 
rity-the-response-was-massive/?utm_term=.49c4af27ba54 [https://perma.cc/8M5F-HN44] (detail-
ing the mass proliferation of #MeToo tweets after the Weinstein story broke). 
 2 See Ronan Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Secret Settlements, NEW YORKER (Nov. 21, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/harvey-weinsteins-secret-settlements [https://perma 
.cc/XTV5-CX6C]. 
 3 See Nina Burleigh, Stormy Daniels Defies Trump to Join Chorus of Women Violating Non-
disclosure Agreements about Sex, Abuse and Harassment, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www. 
newsweek.com/stormy-trump-2016-election-sex-hush-money-835646 [https://perma.cc/2HUB-HK 
B8]. 
 4 For a quick overview of the argument, see Ian Ayres, Targeting Repeat Offender NDAs, 71 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 76, 79–83 (2018). 
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The #MeToo Movement has made demand for reform more preva-
lent than ever. Empowered by their newfound public solidarity, some 
women have begun to breach the terms of their NDAs for the sake of 
the Movement and their own reparation.5 Legislators have scrambled 
to introduce new laws that either protect sexual harassment victims 
seeking to disclose information or prevent employers from hiding these 
stories from the public eye. As of February 2019, seven states have 
adopted bills that impose significant restrictions upon NDAs in the con-
text of sexual harassment.6 In February 2018, the state attorneys gen-
eral unanimously submitted a letter to Congress seeking a ban on arbi-
tration agreements as pertained to workplace sexual harassment 
claims because of the “veil of secrecy” created by private arbitration and 
their related NDAs.7 
As for the judiciary, Judge William Young of the District of Massa-
chusetts cited #MeToo while radically rejecting a corporation’s “C” 
plea—a guilty plea where the prosecutor and the accused agree on pun-
ishment and avoid a jury—in favor of a public trial.8 He wrote: 
Face it, if used in strong cases the “C” plea delegitimizes the cen-
tral role of the trial judge. Any injustice rankles Americans, sys-
temic injustice rankles them profoundly. Those of us who occupy 
the constitutional offices of the United States—in whatever 
branch we serve—must humbly acknowledge that there exists 
in America today a deep and pervasive sense of injustice.9 
By 2017, #MeToo was already showing influence upon Judge 
Young’s decision-making in a case involving the systemic advantages 
granted to corporate defendants.10 It seems likely that other judges 
share his sentiment.11 
 
 5 See Burleigh, supra note 3. 
 6 Antone Melton-Meaux, Sex Harassment Settlements: A New Scarlet Letter for Employers?, 
75 BENCH & B. MINN. 18, 19 (2018); see also NAVEX Global, The Sexual Harassment Legislation 
Watch List (State by State), JD SUPRA (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-
sexual-harassment-legislation-watch-24212/ [https://perma.cc/3FSQ-8CLP]. 
 7 See Melton-Meaux, supra note 6, at 19. 
 8 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
 9 United States v. Aegerion Pharm., Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 217, 228 (D. Mass. 2017) (citing 
Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com 
/entertainment/archive/2017/10/the-movement-of-metoo/542979/ [https://perma.cc/U4LX-F5LH]) 
(other citations omitted). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Cf. Linda L. Berger, Bridget J. Crawford & Kathryn M. Stanchi, Using Feminist Theory to 
Advance Equal Justice under Law, 17 NEV. L.J. 539, 539–40 (2017) (noting that judges were among 
the audience of the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project: Writing the Law conference, where experts 
discussed how “judges applying feminist perspectives could bring about change in the development 
of the law . . . .”). 
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It is surprising, then, that discussion on this topic has been mostly 
confined to popular media sources like the New Yorker12 and the Atlan-
tic.13 Of course, legal scholars have denounced sexual harassment 
NDAs and proposed some legislative restrictions.14 However, none have 
investigated the substantive law that currently applies to NDAs in the 
context of sexual harassment, nor have they considered what the law 
implies for future legislation and whether it is likely to change. Part II 
of this Comment briefly reviews why the current legal regime fails to 
adequately protect future victims of workplace sexual harassment. 
Parts III and IV examine the judiciary’s present treatment of NDAs and 
the underlying rationale behind that treatment, respectively. Part V 
weighs the challenges to reform imposed by current case law against 
the advantages of new legislation. Ultimately, this Comment argues 
that the intersection between nondisclosure and workplace sexual har-
assment presents thorny legal issues that are better resolved by legis-
lation than by judicial reform. 
II.  THE NEED FOR REFORM 
The purpose of this Comment is not to determine what specific 
NDA regulations will serve the best interests of workplace sexual har-
assment victims. Other scholars have already taken that question to 
task, and there is increasing agreement that moderate—but not se-
vere—restrictions should be imposed.15 On the one hand, NDAs are in-
tuitively favorable for employers, since reputational damage and legal 
costs could easily outweigh the costs of settlement with the victim.16 On 
the other, NDAs may also provide many advantages for victims them-
selves, such as a greater likelihood of compensation from their em-
ployer, a quicker end to the painful ordeal, and greater privacy given 
lingering stigmas surrounding workplace victims.17 Therefore, laws 
 
 12 See, e.g., Farrow, supra note 2. 
 13 See, e.g., Hiba Hafiz, How Legal Agreements Can Silence Victims of Sexual Assault, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/legal-agreements 
-sexual-assault-ndas/543252/ [https://perma.cc/7UU7-U5EB]. 
 14 See generally, Ayres, supra note 4; Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment 
from Employment Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 46 (2018). 
 15 See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 3; Vasundhara Prasad, If Anyone Is Listening, #MeToo: Breaking 
the Culture of Silence around Abuse through Regulating Non-Disclosure Agreements and Secret 
Settlements, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2507, 2515–16 (2018) (collecting articles). 
 16 Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil, Criminal, and Sex-
ual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311, 314 (2018). 
 17 See Annie Hill, Nondisclosure Agreements: Sexual Harassment and the Contract of Silence, 
GENDER POL’Y REP. (Nov. 14, 2017), http://genderpolicyreport.umn.edu/nondisclosure-agreements-
sexual-harassment-and-the-contract-of-silence/ [https://perma.cc/ 7VVW-LXWV]; Elizabeth Grac- 
e, Confidentiality of Settlements in Sexual Abuse Cases—Necessary Evil or Positive?, LERNERS 
PERS. INJ. GROUP (Jan. 31, 2013), https://lernerspersonalinjury.ca/articles/confidentiality-of-settle 
ments-in-sexual-abuse-cases-necessary-evil-or-positive/ [https://perma.cc/AN7Y-VZU3]. 
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that ban sexual harassment NDAs outright would deny victims a sig-
nificant opportunity for confidential reparation. The debate continues, 
however, as to what these regulations should encompass and how far 
they should go to prevent such cases.18 
Regardless, a majority of scholars have reached a powerful consen-
sus: reform is necessary in order to prevent employers from crafting 
NDAs that do not amply compensate the victim or that enable perpe-
trators to continue patterns of sexual harassment and assault.19 While 
some settlement agreements boast six to seven-figure payoffs,20 others 
offer far less for similar harm;21 and even for victims who receive large 
payments, money cannot fix their trauma.22 Meanwhile, the stringent 
confidentiality of unfettered NDAs has enabled powerful individuals to 
avoid detection, both by other employees and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (the EEOC), thus opening the possibility for 
decades of abuse across multiple victims.23 Scholarly consensus and the 
plethora of victims’ jarring stories collectively illustrate the need for 
change. 
III.  RELEVANT CASE LAW 
Before delving into the law that governs sexual harassment NDAs, 
it is important to note that provisions that obligate nondisclosure go by 
a few other names, such as “non-assistance” or “confidentiality” provi-
sions. For the purposes of this Comment, an “NDA” refers to any agree-
ment that prevents one party from disclosing some type of information 
to a third party. Moreover, NDAs are difficult to examine in a vacuum. 
This is to say: they rarely come about on their own. As the case law will 
show, the vast majority of NDAs (or at least the ones that generate lit-
igation) occur as components of three sources: settlements, employment 
contracts, and arbitration agreements that arise from those contracts. 
 
 18 See id. 
 19 In addition to the many contributions in this volume, see Schultz, supra note 14 (writing on 
behalf of Rachel Arnow-Richman, Ian Ayres, Susan Bisom-Rapp, Tristin Green, Rebecca Lee, Ann 
McGinley, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Nicole Porter, and Brian Soucek); see also, Ayres, supra note 
4; Prasad, supra note 14; Margaret Ryznar, #MeToo & Tax, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 53, 
53–57 (2018); Ramit Mizrahi, Sexual Harassment Law after #MeToo: Looking to California as a 
Model, 128 YALE L. J. FORUM 121, 140–41 (2018); Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible 
Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 976–77 (2006). 
 20 See Farrow, supra note 2. 
 21 This Comment will directly address one such settlement in Part III. See Bandera v. City of 
Quincy, 344 F.3d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 2003) (refusing to invalidate a settlement agreement in which 
the employer offered to recommend the victim for a substitute teaching position in exchange for 
dropping her case). 
 22 See Farrow, supra note 2 (detailing the many psychological harms that the settlement pro-
cess itself caused upon one of Weinstein’s victims, Ambra Battilana Gutierrez). 
 23 See Ryznar, supra note 19, at 54–57. 
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Legal rules that take aim at these sources will necessarily have an im-
pact on their nondisclosure provisions, and vice versa. This poses a chal-
lenge to this Comment’s analysis because there are some aspects of the 
three sources beyond standalone NDAs that are thematically similar to 
NDAs but outside of the scope of this Comment’s inquiry, e.g., arbitra-
tion procedures or for-cause termination. For the sake of simplicity, 
therefore, this Comment will discuss NDAs that emerge from different 
sources interchangeably. In the rare case where judge-made rules or 
legislation could have different effects on different forms of NDAs, this 
Comment will address those differences expressly. 
A.  Unconscionability and Public Policy Doctrines 
Judicial solutions to the threats posed by sexual harassment NDAs 
rely on two key components of contract law: the “unconscionability” and 
“public policy” doctrines. The former dictates that a judge may refuse to 
enforce a contract’s terms if she finds them to be “unconscionable” or 
otherwise modify them in order to prevent such a finding.24 While what 
constitutes “unconscionable” varies somewhat from state to state, the 
D.C. Circuit has advanced the most popular definition: the “absence of 
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with con-
tract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”25 
Some jurisdictions hold that the “procedural” and “substantive” factors 
of this definition—absence of choice and one-sided terms respectively—
must both be present for a court to render a term unconscionable.26 
Within this group, some courts apply a “sliding scale:” the more proce-
durally unconscionable a term is, the less substantive unconscionability 
is required for a court to rescind that term, and vice versa.27 Other ju-
risdictions, in contrast, may render a contract term unconscionable 
even if the plaintiff only alleges procedural or substantive unconscion-
ability.28 
 
 24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (“If a contract or term thereof is unconscion-
able at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce 
the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of 
any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.”); see also Hume v. United States, 
132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889). 
 25 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see also 
SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 18:9 (4th ed. 
1993 & Update 2018) (collecting cases). 
 26 See Bynum v. Maplebear Inc., 160 F. Supp. 3d 527 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); Summers v. Crestview 
Apartments, 236 P.3d 586, 590 (Mont. 2010). 
 27 See Grayiel v. Appalachian Energy Partners 2001-D, LLP, 736 S.E.2d 91, 102 (W. Va. 2012); 
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 28 See Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enter., Inc., 293 P.3d 1197, 1201 (Wash. 2013) (rendering con-
tract terms void because they were substantively unconscionable, without a consideration of pro-
cedural unconscionability); In re Poly-America, L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 360 (Tex. 2008). 
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In order to determine whether a contract or term is procedurally 
unconscionable, a court considers factors such as disparate bargaining 
power between the parties, differences in business sophistication, rep-
resentation by counsel, ambiguous or misleading contract language, 
and economic, social, or practical duress that may have compelled a 
party to execute the contract against her best interests.29 Contracts of 
adhesion—the often labyrinthine standard-form contracts typically pro-
vided by larger companies—may be procedurally unconscionable per se 
(though many courts must still find substantive unconscionability in 
the terms themselves).30 A term is substantively unconscionable where 
it is so “one-sided or overly harsh” or “exceedingly calloused” so as to be 
“shocking to the conscience.”31 Terms are not substantively unconscion-
able simply because they are much more favorable to one side; their 
one-sidedness ought to suggest that “the weaker party had no meaning-
ful, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to assent to 
the unfair terms.”32 In summary, the unconscionability doctrine is jus-
tified by and applied according to the fundamental public policy princi-
ple that there could be no real freedom of contract if courts had to en-
force contracts that boasted neither mutual interest nor mutual assent. 
The public policy doctrine—in many ways the sibling of unconscion-
ability—states that a term of an agreement is unenforceable if either 
(1) “legislation provides that it is unenforceable” or (2) “the interest in 
its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public 
policy against the enforcement of such terms.”33 Courts consider a vari-
ety of factors when weighing enforcement interests, such as the parties’ 
justified expectations and the negative consequences of non-enforce-
ment.34 As for weighing public policy interests, courts consider factors 
such as legislative precedent, the relation of the contract to the policy 
interest, and the seriousness of enforcement’s consequences as they per-
tain to public policy.35 Accordingly, there is a large variety of terms that 
a court may render void as against public policy. The most paradigmatic 
cases involve agreements to commit illegal acts,36 but the implicated 
action does not need to be explicitly illegal for a court to render it void.37 
 
 29 See Tedesco v. Home Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 407 P.3d 289, 298 (Mont. 2017). 
 30 See Day v. CTA, Inc., 324 P.3d 1205, 1209 (Mont. 2014); see also Grayiel, 736 S.E.2d at 104. 
 31 Gandee, 293 P.3d at 1999. 
 32 Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown, 737 S.E.2d 640, 657 (W. Va. 2012). 
 33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178; see also Williston, supra note 25 at §§ 12:1–
3 (collecting cases). 
 34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(2). 
 35 Id. at § 178(3). This Comment will examine these factors more fully below. 
 36 See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 77 (1982) (rendering unenforceable 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement that violated federal antitrust and labor laws). 
 37 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 192 (promises to commit torts are also 
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Exceptions and inconsistencies abound within and between juris-
dictions, such that an attempt to map the public policy doctrine could 
quickly overwhelm the main focus of this Comment. Therefore, it must 
suffice to say that sexual harassment NDAs may be void as against pub-
lic policy, but only in the specific circumstances that this Comment is 
about to address. Perhaps unconscionability plays a role in some of the 
forthcoming cases, but assuming most legal departments are savvy 
enough to avoid the “shocking”38 behavior necessary to render a contract 
unconscionable, it remains a secondary consideration for the purposes 
of this Comment’s investigation and analysis. The main problem that 
this Comment seeks to address emerges when the employer’s careful 
and sophisticated lawyers intervene in order to contain the damage that 
the perpetrator has already caused.39 
B.  Voiding NDAs to Report Criminal Conduct 
Given the obvious confidentiality of most sexual harassment NDAs 
and the often-steep penalties imposed for violating them, case law on 
the topic is quite limited.40 However, courts have provided enough for 
one to determine the extreme ends of whether these NDAs are unen-
forceable contracts as a matter of public policy. For one, it is clear that 
courts will not enforce NDAs that bar an individual “from providing rel-
evant evidence regarding past allegations of sexual abuse in a domestic 
violence proceeding” or from “reporting future criminal behavior to a 
court.”41 Indeed, any NDA that “purport[s] to suppress information con-
cerning the commission of felonies” is “illegal per se.”42 This also in-
cludes agreements that create a failure of one’s duty to disclose to a 
third party, involve a breach of contract with another party, or other-
wise cause wrongful non-performance.43 However, “[t]he mere possibil-
ity that an employer could use a [nondisclosure] clause to hide illegal 
 
unenforceable). 
 38 See Gandee, 293 P.3d at 1999. 
 39 Granted, some lawyers themselves can be coarse and intimidating, but professional coun-
sels would stay clear of inducing the level of duress necessary for unconscionability. 
 40 This was even more true in 1998, when Terry Dworkin and Elletta Callahan first tackled 
confidentiality more generally. See Terry Dworkin & Elletta Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 151, 153 (Fall, 1998). Dworkin and Callahan’s work represents the most extensive discussion 
on the topic to date. New case law since their date of publication and our particular focus on the 
sexual harassment context distinguishes this Comment from their earlier work. 
 41 Lana C. v. Cameron P., 108 P.3d 896, 902 (Alaska 2005). 
 42 Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663, 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). Accord Perricone 
v. Perricone, 972 A.2d 666, 689 (Conn. 2009); Unami v. Roshan, 659 S.E.2d 724, 727 (Ct. App. Ga. 
2008) (citing 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 16:14 (4th ed.)). 
 43 See Unami, 659 S.E.2d at 727 (citing Lachman v. Sperry–Sun Well Surveying, 457 F.2d 
850, 852–54 (10th Cir. 1972); S. R. & P. Imp. Co. v. Am. Union Bank, 204 N.Y.S. 755, 755–56 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1924); Eggleston v. Pantages, 175 P. 34, 36–37 (Wash. 1918)). 
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activity is . . . insufficient to void the clause on grounds of public pol-
icy.”44 Instead, courts “subject” NDA agreements to “implied exceptions 
for public policy purposes,” so that the agreements are enforceable un-
less they are used to prevent the disclosure of illegal activity to a court.45 
As for the prevention of disclosure to non-governmental sources—even 
if there is potentially unlawful activity involved—such agreements are 
typically legitimate.46 This includes attempts to provide testimony in a 
third party’s civil claim against one’s employer, even though that dis-
closure would take place before a judge.47 
In other words, if a victim has enough evidence that a felony has 
been committed by her harasser or abuser, she may report the felony, 
even when an NDA purports to bar her from such a report. However, as 
the #MeToo Movement has revealed, this is a big “if.” First, as damag-
ing as sexual harassment can be, harassment alone rarely, if ever, qual-
ifies as a felony under state law.48 Second, there are many disincentives 
for a victim to remedy her situation by means of a criminal case. For 
example, she may fear retaliation from other superiors at her corpora-
tion or affiliates of the accused, and criminal law does not necessarily 
supply her with any monetary remedy.49 Third, criminal law’s high 
standard of guilt—beyond a reasonable doubt—makes it incredibly dif-
ficult for a private individual to mount evidence sufficient to prevail at 
trial. This is especially true for sexual harassment and abuse, where 
perpetrators can often cover their tracks, and witnesses have personal 
incentives (including their own settlements) to keep quiet.50 Finally, 
criminal prosecution takes control of the case away from the claimant 
and places it in the hands of a prosecutor, whose central duty is to pun-
 
 44 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, 423 F.3d 446, 457 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 45 Katz v. South Burlington Sch. Dist., 970 A.2d 1226, 1229 (Vt. 2009) (citing Camp v. 
Eichelkraut, 539 S.E.2d 588, 598 (2000)). 
 46 See id.; see also Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (D. Nev. 2006). 
 47 See Saini, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 922; Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hudson, No. 95-1130, 1996 
WL 520789, at *10 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 1996). 
 48 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a (2013) (limiting unwelcomed sexual contact with 
a non-minor, even if the perpetrator is in a position of power over the victim, to a class A misde-
meanor); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 11, §§ 763–773 (2018) (limiting sexual contact with non-minors to a 
misdemeanor offense); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3005 (2019) (requiring that a sexual contact felony be 
brought about by reasonable threat of death, bodily injury, or kidnapping); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/11-1.60 (2019) (imposing a requirement for sexual abuse felonies that the perpetrator used 
or threatened to use a dangerous weapon or caused bodily harm, among others); MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.345 (2019) (requiring a finding that the perpetrator used force or the threat of force in order 
to charge him with felony). 
 49 See Schultz, supra note 14, at 38–39; Nicole Porter, Ending Harassment by Starting with 
Retaliation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 50 (2018). 
 50 See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Of Power and Process: Handling Harassers in an At-Will 
World, 128 YALE L. J. F. 85, 93–94 (June 18, 2018). 
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ish the perpetrator rather than ensure maximum recovery for the vic-
tim.51 In sum, reporting even expressly illegal activity is a difficult hur-
dle to overcome for an inherently nebulous transgression. 
The EEOC works to ameliorate these barriers by institutionalizing 
some investigations;52 whistleblowers who violate their NDAs at the be-
hest of the EEOC are protected.53 And yet, the EEOC cannot be every-
where at once, nor is every employee willing to take on a whistleblowing 
role, especially when employers compel internal disclosure first.54 More-
over, as mentioned above, the EEOC has little justification to launch a 
full investigation if it has not received any reports because the victims 
of a serial harasser are unanimously restrained by NDAs.55 Therefore, 
we must consider the options available outside of criminal law to indi-
viduals who seek to bypass their NDAs for the sake of obtaining a rem-
edy from a civil suit or retribution by public disclosure.56 
C.  NDAs and Self-Enforcement 
EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., Inc.57 provides the leading case for unen-
forceability when criminal activity has yet to be established.58 In Astra, 
the EEOC brought a preliminary injunction against Astra USA, Inc., in 
 
 51 See Lissa Griffin & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ministers of Justice and Mass Incarceration, 30 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 301, 312 (Spring, 2017) (“It is well accepted . . . that the prosecutor is a fiduciary 
who represents the sovereign and must make decisions in the public interest, for society at large—
not any individual client.”) (citing Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 607, 633–34 (1999)). 
 52 The EEOC has endorsed the estimate that one in four women have experienced sexual har-
assment in the workplace, but that many women do not report it. See EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE (2015). Even when they do, in any given year, the 
EEOC resolves roughly 50 percent of their charges under the category of “No Reasonable Cause,” 
and 20.9 percent under “Administrative Closure” (another form of charge failure). EQUAL EMP’ 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGES ALLEGING SEX-BASED HARASSMENT (CHARGES FILED WITH 
EEOC) FY 2010–FY 2018 (2018). Only 22.8 percent of charges resolve with positive outcomes for 
the victim (as defined by the EEOC, not the victim), so there is no way of knowing whether the 
victim has truly received adequate reparation. See id. The EEOC does not provide data for the 
number of NDAs it has challenged in court. However, given the meager case law, that number is 
likely very low compared to the roughly 8,000 charges it resolves each year. See id. Indeed, about 
9 percent of EEOC charges are resolved via settlement, so filings with the EEOC may be creating 
more sexual harassment NDAs. Id. 
 53 See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980); Shores v. Senior 
Manor Nursing Center, Inc., 518 N.E.2d 471 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 
S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, Inc., 684 P.2d 21 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1984); Harless v. First Nat’l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978). 
 54 See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 40, at 190. 
 55 See Ryznar, supra note 19, at 54–57. 
 56 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 50, at 90–92 (discussing the inadequacy of antidiscrimina-
tion law to cover all forms of sexually motivated harm); Tristin K. Green, Was Sexual Harassment 
Law a Mistake? The Stories We Tell, 128 YALE L.J. F. 152 (June 18, 2018). 
 57 94 F.3d 738 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 58 See generally id. 
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order to prevent Astra from entering into or enforcing settlement agree-
ments that prohibited employees from filing sexual harassment claims 
with the EEOC and assisting the EEOC in its investigation.59 Multiple 
Astra employees had communicated to the EEOC that they could not 
divulge any information because of such agreements.60 Indeed, only 
twenty-six out of ninety contacted employees even replied to the 
EEOC’s requests.61 In order to determine whether Astra’s NDAs were 
unenforceable as against public policy, the First Circuit applied a “bed-
rock” balancing test: “[A] promise is unenforceable if the interest in its 
enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy 
harmed by enforcement of the agreement.”62 Specifically, the court 
weighed the impact of the NDAs on the EEOC’s enforcement of Title 
VII against the impact that outlawing those NDAs would have on pri-
vate dispute resolution.63 
According to this test, Astra quickly became an open-and-closed 
case. The EEOC is a public body empowered by Congress, and “it is 
crucial that the Commission’s ability to investigate charges of systemic 
discrimination not be impaired.”64 Furthermore, as the court found sig-
nificant, the EEOC does not only benefit private parties; its investiga-
tions are designed to advance the public interest first and foremost.65 
Even a “sprinkling” of prohibitions that “materially interfere[ ]” with 
communications between an employee and the Commission harms pub-
lic interest.66 The court did recognize that public policy “strongly favors 
encouraging voluntary settlement,” but it ultimately found that unen-
forceability would not (1) create a “substantial disincentive” to settle-
ment, (2) promote further litigation, or (3) disturb the finality of al-
ready-negotiated settlements.67 Read plainly, the First Circuit’s finding 
here is puzzling: confidentiality is a major incentive for corporations to 
privately resolve employee disputes. While arbitration has other ad-
vantages as well, public disclosure was clearly one of Astra, Inc.’s great-
est concerns when it wrote the NDAs at issue.68 Therefore, it is unclear 
 
 59 Id. at 740–41. 
 60 Id. at 741. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 744 (quoting Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). 
 63 Id. at 744. 
 64 Id. (quoting EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 69 (1984)). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. (citing EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., L’Oreal Hair Care Div., 821 F.2d 1085, 1090 (1987)). It is 
important to note for later how the court reserves this interference only for communications with 
the EEOC, not any other party. It does not even suggest that nondisclosure in the sexual harass-
ment setting could be harmful to public interest per se. 
 67 See id. (citing Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981)). 
 68 See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 
1638 (2005). 
583] OPENING CLOSED DOORS 593 
why the Astra court thought that nullifying a central provision of those 
agreements would not disincentivize settlement between Astra and its 
employees; if the nondisclosure provisions were unimportant, why 
would Astra fight for them in court? 
If one were to read Astra as saying that any nondisclosure compo-
nent of an arbitration agreement was non-substantial in terms of incen-
tives for private settlement, one could expect public policy challenges 
against NDAs to be somewhat successful. However, the case law prob-
ably leans in the opposite direction, at least as it applies to private 
plaintiffs. For example, in Saini v. International Game Technology,69 
the Nevada District Court applied Astra’s balancing test and deter-
mined that an employee’s confidentiality agreement was valid even 
though it would prevent employees from providing testimony that In-
ternational Game Technology (IGT) had purposefully sold refurbished 
and defective gambling machines as new products.70 The court distin-
guished its case from Astra on multiple grounds. For one, the protection 
of trade secrets, which was the supposed purpose of IGT’s agreement, 
was more significant than the concealment of sexual harassment com-
plaints.71 Second, the court found that “public policy [in uncovering the 
sale of defective products] is not as high a priority as enforcement of 
sexual harassment law by the EEOC, at least when, as here, the defect 
at issue is not a threat to the safety or economic well-being of the public 
at large.”72 Third, IGT’s terms were part of a “standard agreement;” 
they were not “specifically designed to stifle evidence of wrongdoing.”73 
Finally, the court found it significant that the employee—instead of a 
regulatory agency—had moved to void the NDA and thereby “act as de-
cisionmaker about what information IGT does and does not have a le-
gitimate confidentiality interest in.”74 An employee’s belief that an NDA 
is concealing illegal activity is not enough.75 
At first glance, Saini appears promising for individual victims at-
tempting to void their employer’s NDAs. Indeed, the court asserted that 
the concealment of workplace sexual harassment in Astra was at least 
more significant than the dangers of concealing product defects. How-
ever, a closer reading of the opinion reveals that the court significantly 
limited its consideration of sexual harassment to the context of EEOC 
 
 69 434 F. Supp. 2d 913 (D. Nev. 2006). 
 70 See id. at 923. 
 71 See id. at 923. 
 72 Id. at 921. 
 73 Id. This finding is somewhat questionable if ITG was in fact intentionally short-changing 
its customers. 
 74 Id. at 922. 
 75 Id. 
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investigations. Namely, it specified its consideration of public policy 
concerns in Astra as the “enforcement of sexual harassment law by the 
EEOC.”76 It did not weigh a public interest in encouraging enforcement 
by private individuals—nor, as pertains more closely to #MeToo, the 
attempts of private individuals to seek better remedies in court or bet-
ter retribution in the public eye. The court’s reservation is only made 
clearer by its final distinction that the plaintiff was a private individual 
and not a regulatory agency.77 
The Saini court’s limitation of Astra’s findings to public agency en-
forcement is consistent with the language and underlying rationale of 
Astra itself. As noted above, the First Circuit considered the NDAs in 
question to be harmful to the EEOC’s own actions, not unjust to the 
actual victims involved. Moreover, it felt compelled to expressly recog-
nize the otherwise intuitive notion that the EEOC’s actions benefit the 
public as a whole, not just “private” victims. That court did not, on the 
other hand, discuss whether private challenges to unfair NDAs can also 
similarly benefit the public, especially when harassment is too subtle 
for the EEOC to root out. Perhaps this explains why the First Circuit 
found that a preliminary injunction would not undermine prior settle-
ments or discourage future ones: its holding really only applied to As-
tra’s relationship with the EEOC. Astra and Saini indicate there is a 
significant public interest in preventing workplace sexual harassment, 
but on the whole, that interest only overcomes the public’s interest in 
freedom of contract when it is the government who seeks to advance it. 
1.  EEOC investigations 
Surrounding case law supports the interpretation that government 
investigation / private dispute is the most significant predictor for de-
termining whether a sexual harassment NDA is void as against public 
policy. As regards invalidated agreements, there are plenty of cases in 
which courts have refused to enforce agreements that are likely “to chill 
employees’ participation in legitimate investigations.”78 Given this 
Comment’s discussion so far, “legitimate” may very well be a stand-in 
for “government-led.” In EEOC v. International Profit Associates,79 the 
Northern District of Illinois invalidated a severance agreement that 
prohibited an employee from “disclosing anything relating to his em-
ployment . . . except as may be necessary in response to lawful process 
 
 76 Id. at 921 (emphasis added). 
 77 Id. at 922. 
 78 See, e.g., EEOC v. Int’l. Profit Assocs., No. 01 C 4427, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6761, at *3–4 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2003); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 69 (1984). 
 79 No. 01 C 4427, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6761 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2003).  
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of any judicial or adjudicative authority or otherwise allowed by law.”80 
Here, as in Astra, the court narrowly confined its ruling on the contract 
as “inapplicable to communications with the EEOC.”81 Such a limitation 
strongly invokes the “implied” public policy “exceptions” that allow re-
porting of criminal activity when the reporting party is bound by an 
NDA.82 
In EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,83 the Southern District of New 
York invalidated a non-assistance agreement that required employees 
to notify their direct supervisor and the “Law” or “Compliance” depart-
ments before communicating with the EEOC.84 Even though the con-
tract’s language only threatened the possibility of demotion or termina-
tion if an employee failed to notify the appropriate officers, the court 
found that this language was sufficient to frustrate the EEOC’s inves-
tigation.85 As in Astra, the agreement sported at least a “sprinkling” of 
prohibitions that “materially interfered” with the EEOC’s efforts.86 It 
seems reasonable that Morgan Stanley would want its Law and Com-
pliance departments to stay well-informed about the EEOC’s interac-
tions with its employees, so perhaps the court erred in denouncing the 
company’s prudence. Regardless, this court’s decision illustrates the ju-
diciary’s eagerness to protect and advance the government’s own at-
tempts to curb workplace sexual harassment and discrimination. 
Courts have therefore provided the EEOC with a great boon in enabling 
it to bypass corporate NDAs for the sake of its investigations. However, 
and again, the Commission does not have the resources to investigate 
behind every closed door. 
2.  Private attempts to invalidate NDAs 
The #MeToo Movement has made it clear: private individuals must 
also come forward with their own stories in order to effect meaningful 
social change.87 And yet, despite the judiciary’s eagerness to assist the 
EEOC, it has been less charitable with private actors who attempt to 
invalidate NDAs themselves. As the court proclaimed in Saini, it is not 
 
 80 Id. at *2. 
 81 Id. at *6. 
 82 Katz v. South Burlington Sch. Dist., 970 A.2d 1226, 1229 (Vt. 2009). 
 83 01 Civ. 8421 (RMB) (RLE), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17484 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2002). 
 84 See id. at *5–6. 
 85 See id. 
 86 EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 87 See, e.g., Rhitu Chatterjee, A New Survey Finds 81 Percent of Women Have Experienced 
Sexual Harassment, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, INC. (Feb. 21 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/02/21/587671849/a-new-survey-finds-eighty-percent-of-women-have-experienced-sexua 
l-harassment [https://perma.cc/7DY5-7934]. 
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within the individual’s “prerogative” to determine for herself what type 
of information is “legitimately” confidential.88 
For example, in Perricone v. Perricone,89 the Supreme Court of Con-
necticut enforced a divorce settlement NDA that prevented a celebrity-
doctor’s ex-wife from divulging his purportedly condemnable behavior 
to popular public media sources.90 That court went a little further, in-
terpreting Astra as a case purely concerned with communications to 
public enforcement agencies and thereby writing sexual harassment 
out of the script.91 It also limited voidable nondisclosure provisions to 
five main categories: terms that (1) restrict “the right to speak on mat-
ters of public concern” (referring to voting in public elections), (2) re-
strict communication with a public agency regarding civil rights law 
enforcement (Astra), (3) “require[ ] the suppression of criminal behav-
ior,” (4) suppress information important to public health and safety, or 
(5) impose confidentiality for the benefit of a “public entity or official.”92 
Taken literally, some of these categories should have helped those seek-
ing to invalidate their NDAs. However, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
also urged that the public policy doctrine “should be applied with cau-
tion and only in cases plainly within the reasons on which that doctrine 
rests . . . .”93 Therefore, a term may be enforced even if it could poten-
tially fall into one or more of these categories.94 
Bandera v. City of Quincy95 provides an example of the judiciary’s 
hesitancy to apply the public policy doctrine in private disputes even 
when multiple Perricone categories may be implicated.96 In Bandera, 
the former director of Quincy’s Community Policing Commission at-
tempted to invalidate a settlement agreement after she was allegedly 
coerced into it by her previous attorney.97 According to her trial testi-
mony, for which the jury awarded her $135,000 dollars, Bandera had 
 
 88 Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (D. Nev. 2006). See also Dworking & 
Callahan, supra note 40, at 166–68 (discussing other cases supporting the proposition that “the 
courts seem reluctant to excuse an employee from a confidentiality agreement where breach is 
motivated by personal gain, even in situations where disclosing information might advance public 
safety”). 
 89 972 A.2d 666 (Conn. 2009). 
 90 See id. at 689. 
 91 See id. at 688. 
 92 See id. at 688 (citing Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 891 (5th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Astra 
U.S.A., Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996); Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663, 664 
(Ohio 1988); Pansy v. Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787–88 (3rd Cir. 1994)). 
 93 Id. at 687 (citation omitted). 
 94 See also Katz v. South Burlington School Dist., 970 A.2d 1226, 1228 (Vt. 2009). 
 95 344 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 96 See id. at 50. 
 97 See id. at 49. 
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been excluded from meetings, ridiculed on the basis of her sex, and sub-
jected to graphic stories of the sexual exploits of male officers.98 She was 
fired by the mayor of Quincy soon after bringing her complaint.99 Mean-
while, even the plain language of the settlement appeared suspicious. 
It demanded a general release of all claims and the imposition of non-
admission and non-disclosure agreements concerning her claim in ex-
change for her then-attorney’s full compensation and a promise that the 
mayor would recommend Bandera for a permanent substitute teaching 
position at the city’s public school.100 
The issues of unconscionability in this case are beyond the scope of 
this Comment.101 Nonetheless, the facts of Bandera raise various con-
cerns along the lines provided by Perricone. The settlement and its NDA 
were unduly favorable to the city and its public officials, the potential 
criminal activities of the city and its officers were probably a matter of 
public concern, and the settlement was possibly designed around con-
cealing those potentially criminal activities.102 Despite these potential 
red flags, the First Circuit found that the settlement’s provisions were 
not void as a matter of public policy, citing Astra but refraining from 
entering into a public policy balancing test.103 
Whatever the import of the First Circuit’s refrain, Bandera compel-
lingly illustrates the extra-legal difficulties facing private individuals 
who pursue litigation. Even if they are not barred by a boilerplate arbi-
tration agreement, their employers typically have ample resources to 
compel settlement against the victim’s best interests and return the 
transgressions at issue to a state of nondisclosure. Any litigation is ex-
hausting, resource-intensive, and full of uncertainty, especially for non-
lawyers.104 This is doubly so in the case of a sexual harassment claim, 
which requires that the victim relive her harm at every court proceed-
ing. The same does not apply to the well-informed and well-equipped 
employer. In Bandera, the First Circuit merely stayed the judgment in 
 
 98 See id. 
 99 See id. 
 100 See id. 
 101 Even if the harassing employee exerted undue influence on the victim, the NDA is most 
often between the victim and the employer. Employers, as opposed to individual harassers, often 
have significant incentives and sufficient legal knowledge to prevent the extra risks that would 
emerge from soliciting an NDA via undue influence. Therefore, while the unconscionability doc-
trine is thematically relevant to sexual harassment, courts rarely apply it when the other party of 
an NDA is an employer (assuming the employer is not the individual harasser). 
 102 The public officers involved had likely violated Massachusetts law. See MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 151B § 1.18 (2014). 
 103 Bandera, 344 F.3d at 55. 
 104 See also Arnow-Richman, supra note 50, at 95–96; Schultz, supra note 14, at 46. 
598 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019 
order for the district court to determine whether the settlement agree-
ment had been properly formed.105 However, the case did not make it 
that far: Bandera, who then proceeded pro se, capitulated to the earlier 
settlement agreement, even though the jury’s award would have easily 
covered her legal fees and far exceeded her prospective income as a sub-
stitute teacher.106 Only Bandera’s psychological fatigue and lack of 
trustworthy legal resources could satisfactorily explain why she sub-
mitted to such a bad deal. 
D.  Summary of Findings 
This Comment has so far attempted to carve out a body of case law 
applicable to NDAs that purport to prevent victims of sexual harass-
ment from divulging their stories to the public. Not every case that this 
Comment has examined is expressly linked by precedent. Nor does each 
case tackle the problem of sexual harassment NDAs head-on. Nonethe-
less, they all speak as one in providing the lay of the land: Courts are 
extremely hesitant to render an NDA unenforceable unless (1) the al-
leged harasser is under investigation by the EEOC or (2) the victim has 
strong evidence that the agreement was intended to prevent her from 
reporting a crime, of which there is also substantial proof.107 With this 
review of relevant case law complete, this Comment could conclude. 
However, in order to understand why courts have decided upon these 
doctrines and how they may change after #MeToo, one ought to take a 
closer look at the “bedrock” upon which Astra and its sister cases relied. 
IV.  THE JUDICIARY’S UNDERLYING RATIONALE 
The analysis above raises a crucial question: Why do courts draw 
the line for NDA invalidation between public and private enforcement, 
when such a line clearly leaves some harassment victims vulnerable to 
further harm? True, the foremost duty of the courts is to apply the law, 
not to make ad hoc moral judgments. However, in the case of the com-
mon law public policy doctrine, courts have and will continue to actively 
shape the legal regime that applies to sexual harassment NDAs. Their 
 
 105 Bandera, 344 F.3d at 55. 
 106 The agreement did not even guarantee a position at the school. Mayor Sheets merely prom-
ised to recommend Bandera for a substitute position if she could not secure a full time position 
herself. See id. at 49. Quincy Public Schools currently pays its substitute teachers $85 per day, or 
roughly $15,000 per year if the substitute works every day of the year. Quincy Pub. Sch. Dist. 
#172: Internal Postings: Substitute Tchr., APPTRACK.COM (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.applitrack.c 
om/qps/onlineapp/jobpostings/view.asp?internaltransferform.Url=&internal=internal&district=& 
category=Substitute+Certified [https://perma.cc/834N-TN4S]. 
 107 As laid out in section B, such cases exist in the context of other crimes, but there has been 
no case in which a private plaintiff has succeeded in invalidating an NDA by a showing of clear 
evidence that she was sexually harassed by the other side of the agreement. 
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development of that regime can thus be evaluated for the purposes of 
determining its efficacy and the room it leaves for reform. 
Therefore, the following sections of this Comment take a closer look 
at the underlying principles of the public policy doctrine and the specific 
factors that courts consider in weighing public policy in the sexual har-
assment context. Such an examination is an essential foundation for 
weighing the viability of judicial reform. Ultimately, this part of the 
Comment will find that even though the current judicial regime does 
not optimally advance the interests of sexual harassment victims, its 
approach is motivated by valid concerns for efficiency and accuracy in 
distributing justice. 
A.  The Public Policy Doctrine’s Underlying Rationale 
The line between public and private enforcement can be explained 
by the judiciary’s emphasis on the wrongdoer rather than the victim in 
public policy cases. Voiding a contract despite the universal public in-
terest in freedom of contract is a significant deployment of a court’s au-
thority. Were a court to do so in order to benefit an individual, it would 
raise major concerns about abusing its discretion, especially if that pri-
vate benefit imposed a detriment upon the public overall (such as di-
minishing the binding power of private agreements). Therefore, as 
Dworkin and Callahan’s article, Buying Silence, elaborates, courts limit 
their application of the public policy doctrine to cases in which a bad 
actor’s behavior should not be enforced: 
In general, “freedom of contract” is manifested by the courts’ dis-
inclination to evaluate the substance of agreements between pri-
vate parties. There are cases, however, in which this principle is 
superseded by societal interests, and a court may decline to en-
force a contract term on public policy grounds. The introductory 
note to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that “reluc-
tance to aid the promisee rather than solicitude for the promisor” 
provides the basis for such a determination. Refusals of enforce-
ment on these grounds are designed to deter misconduct and to 
avoid using the courts as instrumentalities of questionable ac-
tivity. 108 
Voiding a term mainly to benefit a sympathetic individual risks in-
juring the public by undermining freedom of contract. However, pun-
ishing a bad actor by refusing to enforce his term advances public inter-
est overall (whether because the actor was trying to get away with a 
 
 108 Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 40, at 162 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, 
introductory note (1981)). 
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crime or because he was clearly abusing contract law, among other rea-
sons). Still, it may be difficult in practice for a court to draw the line 
between the two—that is, between an employer-favorable contract pol-
icy and a behavior so harmful to public policy that it must be rendered 
void. As suggested Part II, that inquiry becomes easier when other 
agencies have already addressed it themselves. 
As Buying Silence points out, Astra provides a great example of the 
courts’ emphasis on refraining from assisting the promisee. If a govern-
ment agency complains that a company is likely concealing unlawful 
action by means of NDAs, the court has good reason to take that agency 
at its word and void such agreements. It is not just that the agreements 
are wrongly concealing unflattering information; they represent a com-
pany’s unwillingness to submit itself to rule of law. Thus, even though 
the EEOC brought a civil injunction, the First Circuit’s refusal to en-
force the NDAs was just a simple extension of the legal rationale that 
there is no “freedom of contract” interest when contracts are used to 
break the law.109 
Nonetheless, Buying Silence does not address a crucial feature of 
both the Restatement and Astra’s decision: both expressly refuse to con-
sider the “solicitude of the promisor” in determining whether an agree-
ment is unenforceable for the sake of public policy. As already ex-
plained, Astra emphasized the EEOC’s function as “vindicat[ing] the 
public interest” rather than only serving private parties.110 The matter 
at hand was not a battle between remedying an employee’s sexual har-
assment and protecting a company’s right to enforce its agreements; it 
was a battle between a company’s (unnecessarily strict) private deal-
ings and an agency’s enforcement responsibilities as laid down by Con-
gress itself.111 What is more, the factors that the First Circuit weighed 
in its balancing test were even larger than the most basic stakes in the 
case. Namely, while the court considered individual impact on Astra for 
the sake of the injunction, as for its balancing test, it did not weigh the 
impact that voiding the NDAs would have on Astra’s relationships with 
its employees. Instead, it weighed “the impact [of its decision] on pri-
vate dispute resolution” overall.112 In other words, the court did not 
weigh the impact of enforcement on the EEOC’s specific investigation 
against Astra; it weighed the impact that these types of agreements 
would have on all EEOC efforts if the court decided to enforce them.113 
 
 109 See, e.g., Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663, 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). See 
also, Katz v. S. Burlington Sch. Dist., 970 A.2d 1226, 1228 (Vt. 2009). 
 110 EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 111 See id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 See id. 
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Nowhere in the opinion is there a speculation on how a ruling for one 
side or the other might affect the actual victims in the case. 
B.  The Courts’ Current Approach Is at Odds with #MeToo’s Princi-
ples 
The main thrusts of #MeToo and its sister movements114 urge us to 
focus on the exact same factors that courts leave out in public policy 
considerations, such as the harm to the victim, the power dynamics be-
tween victim and harasser that exacerbated the harm, and the remedy 
necessary not only to deter the harasser but more importantly to make 
the victim whole again.115 With these #MeToo factors in mind, the 
courts that this Comment examined could have inquired as to whether 
invalidating the NDA was necessary to ensure that the victim finds ad-
equate relief. Under such a regime, companies could still have faith in 
the legitimacy of their employment contracts, so long as they provided 
their employees with generous arbitration terms and a thorough system 
for deterrence and accountability. However, the regime must be dealt 
with as it stands, not as how it should be. 
This is not to say that there was no room in the doctrine for Astra 
to have considered the position of sexual harassment victims. The Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts provides four factors for a court to con-
sider in determining whether a contract should be void as against public 
policy: 
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or ju-
dicial decisions; 
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further 
that policy; 
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to 
which it was deliberate; and 
(d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and 
the term.116 
The First Circuit’s opinion explicitly involved considerations of fac-
tors (a) and (b), but factors (c) and (d) had no explicit role to play. If they 
 
 114 For example, #TimesUp has also gained significant traction in the past two years since 
Weinstein’s behavior was revealed. See About Time’s Up, TIME’S UP, https://www.timesupnow.com/ 
about_times_up [https://perma.cc/QW5P-E9KX] (last visited Jan. 28, 2019). 
 115 See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 50, at 101–02; Green, supra note 56, at 166–68. 
 116 § 178(3)(a)–(d) (1981). Of course, this language was available to the First Circuit by 1996. 
Dworking and Callahan discuss this in Buying Silence but only as pertains to whistleblowers. See 
Dworking & Callahan, supra note 40, at 179–90. 
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did, as regards to (c), one might expect the court to have delved into 
EEOC’s investigation to see the degree of potential harassment at As-
tra. Alternatively, the court could have expressly assumed that (c) was 
satisfied because the possible activity raised to the level of gravity as to 
attract EEOC’s investigation in the first place. Either way, the stories 
of individual victims at Astra could have played a role in determining 
the degree of misconduct. As for (d), plenty in the contract suggested an 
intention to cover up misconduct. The court even noted (but again did 
not explicitly weigh) the concerning silence with which the EEOC’s in-
vestigation was met by numerous Astra employees. 
There is evidence that other courts have externally considered fac-
tors (c) and (d). For example, in Saini, the District of Nevada court noted 
that IGT’s contracts were standard and not designed to cover up con-
sumer fraud.117 Such a particular observation about the case at hand 
has little connection to the nationwide scope of Astra’s test, which Saini 
expressly followed. Furthermore, courts may focus on (c) and (d) in re-
fusing to enforce NDAs that conceal illegal activity. However, this is 
likely because (a) and (b) are already easily satisfied: (a) Enabling crime 
is certainly against legal precedent and (b) allowing reports of that 
crime would surely help prevent it.118 This Comment will address 
whether the weighing of #MeToo factors is actually workable. For now, 
suffice it to show that the court in Astra and other courts have decided 
to orient their opinions towards broader questions of public interests 
rather than fact-intensive issues of individual harm. 
From this—in addition to the language from other opinions that 
suggests likewise—one may gather that courts are more than comfort-
able recognizing the silent plight of workplace sexual harassment vic-
tims, but they have clearly delegated to the EEOC the question of how 
and when to protect those victims. In other words, the judiciary’s cur-
rent approach refrains from determining how to empower those victims 
to protect themselves.119 One can only speculate as to why each court 
unanimously adhered to this particular construction of the public policy 
doctrine. On the one hand, they have a general obligation to follow prec-
edent, but on the other, there was clearly room to branch out without 
totally diverging from the Restatement. Regardless, armed with the 
findings from Part III of this Comment, some speculation should prove 
productive. 
 
 117 Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921 (D. Nev. 2006). 
 118 See, e.g., Katz v. S. Burlington Sch. Dist., 970 A.2d 1226, 1228 (2009). 
 119 See Saini, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 921. 
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C.  The Judiciary’s Current Approach Is Justified 
As this Comment has argued, the best predictor for determining 
the validity of an NDA is whether the party that is seeking to invalidate 
the agreement is a government agency or a private individual. Drawing 
this line keeps the court’s determination simple, because, as in Astra, it 
makes satisfying the Restatement’s first two factors easy: (a) Congress 
clearly supports the EEOC’s Title VII investigations as a matter of pub-
lic policy over a general desire to encourage freedom of contract, and (b) 
allowing companies to enforce their NDAs despite an EEOC investiga-
tion would severely frustrate the EEOC’s efforts and therefore Con-
gress’s wishes. Again, such a ruling is merely an extension of the fun-
damental rationale that the public’s interest in law enforcement is 
prime.120 And if a court is concerned with factors (c) and (d)—even if 
they play no explicit part in the balancing test—the EEOC has done 
much of that consideration for them. From the court’s perspective: (c) 
the misconduct is serious because the EEOC is investigating it, and (d) 
there is likely a direct connection between the agreements and the mis-
conduct, because the EEOC is asking the court to invalidate them. 
Private attempts at invalidating NDAs would require a far more 
difficult deliberation before a court could justify a decision not to enforce 
the agreement. There is no universal piece of legislation proving that 
Congress or state legislatures desire private individuals to violate their 
NDAs in spite of the freedom of contract interest.121 Even if courts could 
comfortably determine that legislative bodies would want the victim to 
come forward in its case, it would then have to decide whether that com-
ing-forward would actually advance, say, the public’s interest in having 
harassment-free workplaces. By the preliminary injunction stage, the 
court would have to not only estimate whether the victim’s case would 
be successful, but also whether its success would serve to deter future 
incidences of sexual harassment. It is far from clear that corporate lia-
bility for officer misconduct actually deters those officers from future 
misconduct.122 
Meanwhile, if courts entertained invalidating an NDA at the sole 
behest of a private plaintiff, they could no longer rely on other agencies’ 
expert judgment—namely, the EEOC or an attorney general—as to 
whether alleged misconduct was serious and whether the agreements 
are connected to that misconduct. A court could compare the victim’s 
 
 120 Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663, 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). Accord Perricone 
v. Perricone, 972 A.2d 666, 689 (Conn. 2009); Unami v. Roshan, 659 S.E.2d 724, 727 (Ct. App. Ga. 
2008) (citing 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 16:14 (4th ed.)). 
 121 As we will see, this may change in the future. 
 122 Harvey Weinstein is too easy an example. See also Arnow-Richman, supra note 50, at 95–
96. 
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testimony and evidence with that of the company’s own (the dreaded 
“he-said / she-said” problem). However, as evinced by Bandera, courts 
are rightfully hesitant to conduct a mini-trial on such issues in order to 
determine whether or not the case can even proceed.123 Instead, it is 
simpler to adhere to basic contract principles in these cases rather than 
commit every NDA breach to intensive litigation before liability can 
even be established.124 Again, the hope is that the EEOC will protect 
these victims for whom arbitration or criminal law is insufficient. 
V.  STATUTORY REFORM AND ITS ADVANTAGES 
A.  Existing Case Law Does Not Provide for Effective Reform 
A consideration of the many disadvantages posed by reforming the 
judiciary’s approach makes evident that legislative measures are the 
best option for improving the state of the law surrounding NDAs in the 
context of sexual harassment. As this Comment has already examined, 
the current case law fails to address many of the important interests 
and intricacies that the #MeToo Movement has brought to light. This is 
indubitably a major concern. First, however, there are the standard 
criticisms of case law as a platform for social change, both practical, 
such as its long time-horizon, and political, such as the needed cooper-
ation from other branches of government.125 Second, there are problems 
facing judicial reform unique to the context of NDAs and sexual harass-
ment. Sexual harassment is an extremely divisive issue, and not all 
 
 123 Bandera v. City of Quincy, 344 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2003) (“But by the same token the 
district court cannot summarily deny enforcement simply because material facts are in dispute: 
the task is to resolve the dispute. And, in this instance, it is unlikely—though perhaps not impos-
sible—that the matter could be resolved without an evidentiary hearing.”). 
 124 Efficiency is an important consideration when courts resolve issues of first impression or 
demands for reform. For example, the Supreme Court has many times invoked the federal judici-
ary’s limited case capacity in defining the limitation of “Federal Question Jurisdiction”—the ability 
of federal courts to hear cases involving federal issues. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prod. v. 
Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 318–19 (2005) (“For if the federal labeling standard without a 
federal cause of action could get a state claim into federal court, so could any other federal standard 
without a federal cause of action. And that would [mean] a tremendous number of cases.”); see also 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). Letting too many cases into federal court would not only create an imbal-
ance between the state and federal systems, it would pose a serious threat to the efficiency of 
federal courts. See also Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 811–12 (1986) (noting 
the “increased [complexity and] volume of federal litigation” as “considerations that should inform” 
efficiency decisions in the interpretation of Federal Question). Promptness and accuracy are both 
essential components in delivering justice, so an inefficient system threatens to become an unjust 
one. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“The purpose of this 
revision, adding the words ‘and administered’ to the second sentence, is to recognize the affirma-
tive duty of the court to exercise the authority conferred by these rules to ensure that civil litigation 
is resolved not only fairly, but also without undue cost or delay. As officers of the court, attorneys 
share this responsibility with the judge to whom the case is assigned.”). 
 125 See generally, GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2nd ed. 2008). 
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courts are likely to share Judge Young’s pro-victim sentiments.126 More-
over, a balancing test that considers the victim’s harm in every attempt 
to invalidate an NDA is not a reasonably workable judicial regime. 
As mentioned above, courts are hesitant to resolve complex dis-
putes of fact before it is clear that a plaintiff actually has a valid 
claim.127 Determining whether an NDA is invalid because it is being 
used to cover up sexual harassment would require a court to figure out 
whether or not the victim was actually sexually harassed. Such a deter-
mination could take years, and a regime that requires it would enable 
complainants to unduly burden their employers and the courts. Moreo-
ver, even if the courts had the resources to reasonably allow for these 
private investigations in every case—and corporations had the re-
sources to tolerate them without seriously affecting employment condi-
tions—it is asking them to make some very difficult determinations in 
every instance. 
Under this alternative regime, courts would have to consider: 
(1) Was there sexual harassment for which the other party is 
responsible? 
(2) Is an NDA preventing the disclosure of that harassment? 
(3) What is the degree of harm? 
(4) Are the standard remedies currently available to the plaintiff 
outside of this court sufficient to remedy that harm? 
(5) If not, would invalidating the NDA make a better remedy 
available—in other words, is the NDA the reason for the victim’s 
lack of recourse? 
(6) If invalidation would aid the victim, and recognizing that 
there is a default public interest in freedom of contract, would 
invalidation in this case create a precedent that would advance 
public interest overall? 
Alternatively, courts could abandon the general public policy con-
siderations of the current doctrine, but reinventing the wheel is danger-
ous when no better framework is apparent. 
It is difficult to imagine how requiring these questions would pro-
liferate an efficient legal system. It is even harder to imagine that 
 
 126 See United States v. Aegerion Pharm., Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 217, 228 (D. Mass. 2017); Megan 
Keller, Poll: Over 40 Percent Believe #MeToo Movement Has Gone Too Far, HILL (Oct. 31, 2018) 
https://thehill.com/homenews/news/414076-poll-over-40-percent-believe-metoo-movement-has-go 
ne-too-far [https://perma.cc/J7Q2-TRNR]. 
 127 Bandera, 344 F.3d at 52. 
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judges, legal generalists by necessity, are equipped to answer these 
questions correctly in every case. For these reasons, the status quo is 
more justified than was first apparent. Namely, it is sound public policy 
in itself for a court to require that at least some of the questions sur-
rounding a sexual harassment NDA are answered first by agency inves-
tigation and criminal prosecution. The tradeoff with this governmental 
approach, of course, is that it provides limited remedies to victims, even 
though it is most likely to focus on the most serious incidences of har-
assment and assault. And as some scholars convincingly argue, the cur-
rent regulatory scheme may not do enough to affirmatively incentivize 
victims and witnesses to come forward.128 Nonetheless, because case 
law does not provide room for a compelling judicial alternative, we must 
look towards other avenues for reform. 
B.  Advantages of Legislation 
Legislation is the best avenue: it will better serve sexual harass-
ment victims by preventing harmful NDAs from the outset rather than 
trying to strike them down retroactively in court. Some scholars have 
already put thought into what this legislation should look like. For ex-
ample, in Targeting Repeat Offender NDAs,129 Ian Ayres suggests a 
“middle ground” that would allow for NDAs that could still protect vic-
tims who seek confidentiality but would prevent their validity when 
used to protect “serial offenders.”130 In contrast, this Comment does not 
seek to propose the “right” legislation. Instead, as with its consideration 
of case law, the Comment seeks to address legislation as it stands in 
order to determine whether legislatures can ameliorate the #MeToo 
concerns that have been raised throughout this inquiry. 
1. Examples of ongoing statutory reform 
California and New York provide instructive case studies, not only 
because they are influential and commercially powerful states, but also 
because they are currently leading the way in passing new and ambi-
tious #MeToo laws. Effective as of January 1, 2018, California’s newly 
amended civil procedure code states: 
(a) Notwithstanding any other law, a provision within a settle-
ment agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual infor-
mation related to the action is prohibited in any civil action the 
 
 128 See Schultz, supra note 14, at 39 (citing Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending Harassment by 
Starting with Retaliation, 71 STAND L. REV. ONLINE 49 (2018)); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in 
an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 115, 136–39 (2014)). 
 129 Ayres, supra note 4, at 79–83. 
 130 See id. at 78–79. 
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factual foundation for which establishes a cause of action for civil 
damages for any of the following: 
(1) An act that may be prosecuted as a felony sex offense. . . . 
(4) An act of sexual assault, as defined in paragraphs (1) to (9), 
inclusive, of subdivision (e) of Section 15610.63 of the Welfare 
and Institutions Code, against an elder or dependent adult, as 
defined in Sections 15610.23 and 15610.27 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code. 
(b) Notwithstanding any other law, in a civil action described in 
paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, of subdivision (a), a court shall 
not enter, by stipulation or otherwise, an order that restricts the 
disclosure of information in a manner that conflicts with subdi-
vision (a). 131 
Were Saini a case about sexual misconduct, this code’s language 
may have produced the opposite result. Specifically, the language pro-
hibits the enforcement of any contract that purports to prevent a victim 
or crucial witness from coming forward in a civil claim. True, the code 
does not reach so far as sexual harassment, which is not a felony in 
California, but it would take some clever drafting to somehow specify 
that an NDA applies to disclosures about sexual harassment but not 
sexual assault. Bare minimum, such language would put employees 
and the court on notice that the corporation providing such agreements 
has sinister intent to conceal its misdeeds. 
As discussed above, the connection between the NDA and the harm 
at bar is at least a tacit consideration during a public policy challenge 
to a contract provision.132 A court would be more comfortable voiding a 
contract as against public policy when its plain language suggests that 
the company aims to evade due accountability.133 Finally, and most im-
portantly, this law remedies an essential problem with the judiciary’s 
current reliance on the EEOC and prosecutors to root out sexual as-
sault: it ensures that victims can personally recover damages by means 
of a civil claim once the sexual misconduct has been established in a 
criminal proceeding. 
New York has taken even greater steps, with an improved atten-
tion to the position of employee-victims. Its new legislation (Section 
5003-b) says: 
 
 131 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002(a)–(b) (2019). 
 132 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 178(3)(a)–(d) (1981); Saini v. Int’l Game 
Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921 (D. Nev. 2006). 
 133 See id. 
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Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, for any claim or 
cause of action, whether arising under common law, equity, or 
any provision of law, the factual foundation for which involves 
sexual harassment, in resolving, by agreed judgment, stipula-
tion, decree, agreement to settle, assurance of discontinuance or 
otherwise, no employer, its officer or employee shall have the au-
thority to include or agree to include in such resolution any term 
or condition that would prevent the disclosure of the underlying 
facts and circumstances to the claim or action unless the condi-
tion of confidentiality is the plaintiff’s preference. Any such term 
or condition must be provided to all parties, and the plaintiff 
shall have twenty-one days to consider such term or condition. 
If after twenty-one days such term or condition is the plaintiff’s 
preference, such preference shall be memorialized in an agree-
ment signed by all parties. For a period of at least seven days 
following the execution of such agreement, the plaintiff may re-
voke the agreement, and the agreement shall not become effec-
tive or be enforceable until such revocation period has expired.134 
Like California’s law, Section 5003–b prevents employers from in-
dependently establishing NDAs that would prevent their employees 
from disclosing information about sexual harassment in a civil suit. In-
ventively, under this statute, an employee can still agree for such a pro-
vision to be enforceable, but only after the required deliberation period 
and in her sole discretion. This certainly ameliorates general concerns 
about employee bargaining power in the face of corporate giants, while 
preserving an option for employees who desire confidentiality them-
selves.135 The language is somewhat unclear, but “underlying facts and 
circumstances to the claim” leaves open the possibility that the law pre-
vents a company from restraining a victim from disclosing her story 
outside of court. 
2.  Forecasting the impacts of reform 
These statutes may be too recent to produce case law examples of 
their impact on victims’ attempts to invalidate NDAs.136 On the other 
 
 134 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5003–b (McKinney 2018). 
 135 See generally Arnow-Richman, supra note 50; Ayres, supra note 4. 
 136 As of September 13, 2019, no case has cited New York’s statute. As for California’s statute, 
no cases have emerged, though it is cited by a series of complaints against USA Gymnastics and 
Michigan State University for their alleged cover up of Dr. Lawrence Nassar’s sexual violations. 
See, e.g., Complaint at 202, Davis v. Mich. State Univ., No. 1:17-cv-00029, 2018 WL 4329266 (W.D. 
Mich. Sep. 10, 2018). As one can tell from the complaint’s jurisdiction, the California statute is not 
central to the plaintiff’s claim. 
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hand, more than a year has passed since they both became effective.137 
Silence itself could speak to their efficacy: a lack of new cases involving 
sexual harassment NDAs suggests a decrease in frequency for contrac-
tual cover-ups that provide insufficient solicitude and reparation for the 
victim. That is a victory for legislation in itself, even if #MeToo’s cul-
tural shift has so far led the charge.138 
Regardless, the future impact of these laws may be projected by 
imposing them on the cases examined above. For one, a statute in the 
style of California’s could have deterred the strongly one-sided settle-
ment arrangement that featured prominently in Bandera.139 First, Cal-
ifornia only requires an act that “may” be prosecuted as a felony sex 
offense for its code to apply.140 Even if Bandera did not suffer from such 
an act—in California, the unwanted touching of an intimate area for 
the purpose of sexual gratification—the threat of such an allegation and 
the prolonged litigation required to validate it would have left the City 
of Quincy far more desperate to resolve the case.141 Second, Bandera’s 
claims would have served as an even stronger warning to the City of 
Quincy: if any of the City’s employee-perpetrators went further in their 
actions, the City would have to face a claimant whom they could not 
silence through settlement. California’s new law not only preserves dis-
closures to a court in a criminal case; by proactively preventing certain 
NDAs from being formed, it empowers a potential felony sex offense 
victim to share the information of her harm as she sees fit. Thus, the 
City of Quincy would have had stronger incentives to immediately elim-
inate any risks among its personnel in order to prevent public outrage 
after the victim’s disclosure, no matter the case’s actual outcome. 
New York’s statute, which includes sexual harassment NDAs, 
would have prevented Bandera’s plight altogether.142 Because it only 
allows NDAs when they are the “plaintiff’s preference,” Quincy would 
likely have had to offer more money to Bandera in exchange for her 
silence. And even if Bandera mistakenly moved to accept the first deal 
due to bad counsel or ignorance of the law, the court could have invoked 
the New York code in preventing its signing or invalidating it retroac-
tively. Indeed, the statute might have obliged the court to do so. 
 
 137 California and New York’s laws became effective on January 1, 2018, and July 11, 2018, 
respectively. 
 138 See Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Moral Attitudes, and Behavioral Change, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 242–67 (Eyal Zamir & Doron 
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 139 Bandera v. City of Quincy, 344 F.3d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 140 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002(a) (2019). 
 141 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4 (2019). 
 142 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5003–b (McKinney 2018). 
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Finally, whatever the concrete impacts of these laws will be, they 
will likely influence how courts resolve attempts to void sexual harass-
ment on public policy grounds. Returning to the Restatement, “the 
strength of that policy as manifested by legislation . . .” is one of the four 
main factors that courts consider in determining whether to enforce a 
challenged term.143 Therefore, a court whose state has a law that re-
stricts sexual harassment NDAs can be more confident in refusing to 
enforce those agreements than a court whose state lacks them. Moreo-
ver, the more states that put such laws in place, the more likely a court 
will look beyond the laws of its own state when weighing the public pol-
icy interest in refusing to enforce an agreement. Were Congress to enact 
such a law, the effect would be all the more prolific. 
C.  Counterarguments 
The most immediate rebuttal to this Comment’s argument is that 
courts will have to change too—statutory reform alone will be insuffi-
cient. Indeed, it is challenging for legislatures to craft laws that provide 
answers for every incident. After all, sexual harassment law has not 
worked so far, and victims are likely to continue to slip through the 
cracks.144 However, arguing for an emphasis on legislative reform does 
not leave court reform by the wayside. In fact, legislative reform is prob-
ably the best chance at encouraging the courts to change their own doc-
trine. As this Comment just observed, the legislative scheme at hand is 
a primary consideration for courts in determining whether or not a con-
tract is void as a matter of public policy.145 The more that Congress and 
state legislatures restrict sexual harassment NDAs generally, the more 
comfortable a court will be in stretching that law a little further to in-
validate a contract in a special case. And as many law and economics 
experts have argued, the law itself has the capacity to alter cultural 
attitudes, including those of judges.146 In making the legal leap smaller 
for courts seeking to invalidate a sexual harassment NDA, we can ex-
pect those leaps to also become more common. 
A critic might also argue that the positive influence of statutory 
reform upon the courts could be nullified—and some new laws 
preempted—by pre-existing legislation that favors private settlement, 
 
 143 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 178(3)(a). 
 144 See generally Green, supra note 56. 
 145 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 178(3)(a). 
 146 See Bilz & Nadler, supra note 138, at 243 (suggesting that even where judges fail to follow 
the public trend, public outrage against their decisions as motivated by new laws encourages them 
towards legal reform) (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 
903–68 (1996)). 
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namely, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).147 In AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion,148 the Supreme Court held that state laws and judge-made 
rules could be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act when they 
“stand[ ] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.”149 Specifically, the Court invali-
dated a Californian judge-made rule that rendered a consumer arbitra-
tion contract of adhesion unconscionable where disputes involve low 
damages and the weaker party alleges a scheme to defraud.150 It found 
that rule to be in conflict with the FAA, which “reflect[s] . . . a liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration.”151 Hence, a skeptical court could in-
voke Concepcion in invalidating aggressive statutory reform by finding 
that an anti-NDA law is so restrictive that it has a “disproportionate 
impact” on Congress’s larger goal of encouraging (often confidential) ar-
bitration.152 Alternatively, during a public policy inquiry, it could con-
sider the FAA and Congress’s interest in encouraging arbitration as 
outweighing the influence of state laws that restrict certain sexual har-
assment NDAs. 
First, however, the enforcement of arbitration at issue in Concep-
cion and the enforcement of sexual harassment NDAs are not wholly 
entwined issues. For one, arbitration does not always emerge from a 
harmful, prolific, and intentional act that is solely the fault of the dom-
inant party. Instead, it is often an alternative approach for both parties 
in a mutual dispute. Moreover, the restriction of a specific contract term 
in a specific factual context is unlikely to have a material effect on the 
rate of arbitration overall. While confidentiality is one major advantage 
of arbitration, it is not an integral feature of it; courts can also impose 
confidentiality on their proceedings “for good cause.”153 And even if sex-
ual harassment NDA restrictions were sufficient to be materially dis-
ruptive, employers still have plenty of incentives to prefer arbitration, 
including forum consistency, quicker procedure, et cetera.154 
Second, lower courts have significantly limited the potential effect 
of Concepcion by upholding laws that have a far more significant impact 
on the enforcement of arbitration agreements than restrictions devoted 
solely to the sexual harassment context. For example, just after the 
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 148 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
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 150 Id. at 338. 
 151 Id. at 339 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
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Concepcion decision was handed down, the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court upheld an earlier decision that ruled that “an employment 
contract containing an agreement by the employee to limit or waive any 
of the rights or remedies conferred by [Massachusetts law] is enforcea-
ble only if such an agreement is stated in clear and unmistakable 
terms.”155 Most significantly, that court recognized an overriding public 
policy in preventing gender discrimination, even in light of the FAA and 
Massachusetts’ own pro-arbitration laws.156 It ultimately determined 
that restrictions on arbitration agreements still kept with the “generous 
spirit” of the FAA, so long as the parties were “free to agree” on arbitra-
tion.157 Such a ruling could save even New York’s strong anti-NDA stat-
ute, since that code does not prevent settlement or arbitration of har-
assment claims outright; the employer merely needs to offer more to the 
victim in order for her to agree to an NDA.158 
Finally, the FAA itself states that arbitration agreements are en-
forceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”159 The unconscionability doctrine was in 
place by the time the Act was passed in 1925, so it could not be con-
strued to restrain the courts’ capacity to protect exploited victims.160 
Given that the public policy doctrine stems from the same foundational 
principles as unconscionability, the logic that applies to the FAA and 
unconscionability should extend in turn.161 
In summary, an invalidation of sexual harassment NDA laws via 
the FAA is unlikely due to their distance from the thrust of Concepcion 
and the current trend among lower courts of preserving judicial and 
legislative capacity to regulate employer-employee agreements. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Sexual harassment is one of the thorniest issues in modern dis-
course, and every strategy for reform will have its own set of ad-
 
 155 Warfield v. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc. 910 N.E.2d 317, 326 (Mass. 2009); 
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vantages, disadvantages, and uncertainties. Nonetheless, as this Com-
ment has argued, legislative reform is the most promising area of focus. 
Standing on its own, current case law and judicial procedure is too in-
flexible to incorporate all of victims’ best interests without severely clog-
ging the courts—and hurting victims as employees in the long run. The 
legislative approach, in contrast, can both prevent harmful NDAs from 
being created in the first place and aid victims when they do seek to 
invalidate them in court. Moreover, legislation not only reflects a cul-
tural change away from the acceptance of harmful sexual behavior, it 
has the possibility of spreading that change to judicial attitudes as well. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion may or may not serve 
as an outer limit for just how restrictive anti-NDA law can become. 
However, whether Concepcion applies to such laws is still uncertain, 
and the Court has let stand judicial embrace of some rules that would 
likely have a greater impact on arbitration overall. Finally, even if Con-
cepcion will curtail some of the most extreme anti-NDA legislation, 
lesser restrictions can make material contributions to the plights of har-
assment victims. As this Comment observed in New York’s new code, 
tweaks to tertiary considerations such as a mandatory negotiation pe-
riod can still provide a serious boon to underpowered plaintiffs, who 
typically do not have the resources to quickly understand the import of 
every legal matter. 
Whether the reader accepts any of the preceding arguments, this 
Comment should serve as an accumulation and evaluation of key cases 
and statutes that will take center stage as sexual harassment NDA law 
continues to develop. This new “body” of law is in no way comprehen-
sive, since the Comment had to draw on multiple categories of contract 
law in order to create a satisfactory picture of the legal landscape facing 
individuals who wish to breach their NDAs. But that legal landscape 
does exist, and even the most skeptical reader can appreciate the chal-
lenges it poses. The ultimate hope of this Comment is that if the reader 
takes away nothing else, she can agree on the need for reform. 
